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THE CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF PRESENTENCE REPORTS
by
Louis J. SHARP*
Attention to the confidential nature of presentence investigation
reports of probation officers has been sharpened in recent years by the
increasing use of this device in criminal law and more specifically by a
Supreme Court decision in 1949 in Williams v. People of the State of
New York1 which bears on this point.
In the Williams case the Supreme Court was presented with an
appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals of New York upholding
a conviction of murder in the first degree. The jury found the defendant
guilty but recommended life imprisonment. The trial judge, after con-
sidering the presentence investigation report prepared by an officer in the
court's probation department, imposed the death penalty. In explaining
the more severe sentence, the judge indicated he was influenced by the
heinous nature of the crime as brought to light at the trial, and just as
cogently by the persistent criminality and degeneracy of the defendant as
shown in the presentence investigation report. The report had not been
shown to the defendant or his counsel, a procedure unnecessary under the
law of the State of New York.'
Here seemed to be a case in which the right of a defendant to be
confronted with derogatory information against him was clearly at issue.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals of New
York,8 in an opinion of considerable importance to the legal and correc-
tional fields.
Value of the Presentence Investigation Report
Advocates of greater individualization of treatment of convicted
offenders stress the importance of sentences based on sound and complete
knowledge of the offender-his character, background, physical and
mental makeup, and many other factors aside from the offense itself.
0 Chief, Division of Probation, Administrative Office of the United States Courts;
A.B., Southwest Missouri State College, 1937; M.A., University of Illinois, 1938.
'337 U.S. 241 (1949).
2 N.Y. CODE CRIM. P. § 931.
3 The death sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment.
Sound knowledge of the background of an offender facilitates the
court's task of determining a sentence which provides requisite protection
for society and aids the court in reaching a decision whether to grant
probation to those defendants who may be expected to profit from it. A
court does this much more accurately if provided with a careful estimate
of the defendant's character, situation, and tendencies for good and evil,
than if it depends on such understanding as can be gained during a trial
or from the briefest kind of an interview with the defendant before the
bench at the time of sentence. A number of jurisdictions provide for
this important information through presentence investigations of defend-
ants by the probation department." As one federal judge has said, "Of
all the administrative aids available to the judge an adequate, comprehen-
sive, and complete presentence investigation is the best guide to intelligent
sentencing."5
Such an investigation includes four main essentials. A study is made
of the complete social history of the individual, including his personal
and family background, school and work record, economic status, physical
and emotional health, moral and recreational habits, and a description of
his ambitions, hopes, and fears. A community-wide investigation amasses
personal information from neighbors, coworkers, friends, and others
among whom the defendant has lived and worked. Delinquency and
criminal records are checked through court, police, and identification
agency records. Then finally, there is the analysis of the material col-
lected, the reasons for the offense if they can be isolated with any clarity,
and the recommendation by the probation officer to the court whether
probation is indicated.
Three Major Areas of Discussion
The question of the confidential nature of presentence reports is a
fundamental one not only for the legal profession but for those re-
sponsible for the treatment of offenders in institutions, and on probation
and parole. In a discussion of this subject there are three major questions
to be considered:
1. Whether the presentence investigation report should be made
available to persons and agencies having a specific professional interest
in it;
2. Whether the presentence investigation report should be made a
4 E.g. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c); ILL. ANN. Stat. § 37.773; N.Y. CODE CRIM. P. § 931;
N.C. CRIM. P. § 15-206.
5 Campbell, William J., "Developing Systematic Sentencing Procedures," FEDERAl
PROBATION, September 1954, p. 3.
matter of court record after sentence and thus be open to public inspection;
3. Whether the presentence investigation report should be made
available to counsel for the defense and the defendant.
The differences of existing opinion vary when considered in relation
to each of these questions. Let us look at each in turn.
Disclosure of the presentence report to persons and agencies with a
specific professional interest in its contents.-It is generally agreed, per-
haps without exception, that persons and agencies with a legitimate pro-
fessional interest in the probationer or his family should not arbitrarily
be denied access to the report. These include social agencies, physicians
and psychiatrists, law-enforcement officers, correctional institutions, pro-
bation and parole departments, and other agencies which cooperate with
the court and probation office and are available for personal services to
the defendant and his family. Prosecuting attorneys would also fall
within this group.
There is unusual unanimity of agreement on the need for disclosure
under these circumstances. A definite provision for disclosure is made in
the statutes in some jurisdictions.6 There is often the requirement in the
law that the presentence report itself, or essentially the information in it,
be provided the institution in which the defendant is to be confined or be
given to the correctional authority in the state responsible for the institu-
tional treatment of offenders.7 In the federal courts it is left to the dis-
cretion of the court.8 The writer knows of no state in which there is a
specific prohibition against disclosure under these conditions.
The presentence investigation report as a part of the court record
after sentence and thus open to public inspection.-This arrangement is
provided for by statute in California where the law reads:
Immediately after judgment has been pronounced, the judge and the district
attorney, respectively, shall cause to be filed with the clerk of the court
a brief statement of their views respecting the person convicted or sentenced
and the crime committed, together with such reports as the probation officer
may have made relative to the prisoner. .... 9
Disclosure in this way is not widespread in other jurisdictions. Such
provision makes the presentence investigation report open to public in-
spection.
Disclosure of contents of presentence report to defendant and his
counsel.-In regard to the disclosure of the presentence investigation
report to counsel for the defense and to the defendant himself, there are
6 E.g. N.C. CRIM. P. § 15-206.
7 E.g. N.Y. CODE CRIM. P. § 931; CAL. PEN. CODE § 1203.01.
8 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32; 18 U.S.C. 3652; 18 U.S.C. 3655.
9 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1203.01. ALA. CODE tit. 42, § 23 (1940) provides that the
presentence report is privileged and "shall not be available for public inspection
except upon order of the court to which the same was referred."
sharply divergent views which have remained far from settled even by
the Supreme Court decision in the Williams case. It is to a discussion of
the controversy in this area that the remainder of this paper will be
devoted.
Broadly, the position taken by the proponents of disclosure to de-
fense counsel is that since the sentence affects the defendant almost as
importantly as the judgment of guilty, the defendant has the same right
of cross examination and rebuttal of anything the judge takes into con-
sideration in shaping sentence that he has in conducting his defense, and
further has the right to insist that the judge state publicly the factors
taken into account at the sentencing."
Those opposed to disclosure of the contents of the presentence re-
port to defense counsel argue that due process is not violated by denial
of the report to defense counsel and that disclosure will destroy the value
of the presentence report.
Constitutional Rights of the Defendant
In the literature of both the legal and the correctional fields there
have been discussions of due process in relation to the preparation and
submission of presentence investigation reports to the court. Strong
arguments have been advanced on both sides. One federal judge, for
example, has made this observation:"
Despite the latitude permitted by the Due Process Clause, it seems to me
that a judge in considering his sentence, just as in trying a defendant,
should never take into account any evidence, report or other fact which is
not brought to the attention of defendant's counsel with opportunity to
rebut it. Audi alteram partem, if it is not a universal principle of democratic
justice, is at any rate sufficiently well-founded not to be departed from by
a trial judge when he is performing his most important function. In those
situations where a wife, a minister, a doctor or other person is willing to
give confidential information to the judge provided that the defendant
does not hear it, this information ought to be revealed to the defendant's
counsel for scrutiny and reply. This in no sense implies "a requirement of
rigid adherence to restrictive rules of evidence properly applicable to the
trial" (Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247) or "open court testimony
with cross-examination." (Id. at 250.) Other methods will avoid those
grave errors which sometimes follow from acting on undisclosed rumor
and prejudice.
In some states, disclosure to defense counsel is made mandatory by
'0There is no question that under the Constitution (AMENDMENTS V, VI, XIV) a
person may not be convicted in either a federal or a state court without having had
the opportunity to hear and refute evidence against him. See also Note, 49 Col. L. Rev.
567-572 (1949).
11Wyzanski, Charles E., Jr., "A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility," 65
Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 1291 (1952).
law. This is the case, for example, in Alabama 2 and in Ohio."5  The
same rule is well established in England and Canada." In many other
states, the court is granted specific authority to permit inspection of the
presentence report by authorized individuals, presumably including the
defendant and his counsel.'"
The development of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure may
best exemplify the controversy in this area. The issue of the confidential
nature of presentence reports arose early in the formulation of the Rules. "
The Advisory Committee appointed by the Supreme Court in February,
1941 included in the draft recommended to the Court the following
language:
* * * After determination of the question of guilt, the report shall be
available, upon such conditions as the court may impose, to the attorneys
for the parties and to such other persons or agencies having a legitimate
interest therein as the court may designate.'
7
This language was a clear directive that the contents of the presentence
report be disclosed to counsel for the defendant. Although the court
was given the power to impose conditions under which disclosure was to
be made, there would have appeared no logical way in which the court
could have ordered withholding of the information from the defendant
himself.18
There followed considerable discussion of the possible effects of
such a practice. Judges accustomed to treating the reports as confidential
expressed great apprehension that disclosure would seriously impair the
12 ALA. CODE tit. 42, § 23 (1940) reads in part: ". . . in no case shall the right
to inspect said report be denied the defendant or his counsel after said report has
been completed or filed."
13 LAWS OF 1951, S.B. 306, GEN. CODE § 11521-1 says: "... (the report) . . .
shall not be considered by such judge . . . at any stage of the proceedings . . . unless
and until the full contents of such report shall have been made readily available and
accessible to all parties to the case or controversy or their respective counsel."
14 For a thorough review of the English and Canadian rule, based on the statutes
and cases, see Rex v. Stevenson, Court of Appeal of British Columbia, June 22, 1951.
(From footnote 13 in "Probation and Due Process of Law," Focus, March 1952, p. 46.)
15E.g. N.C. CRIM. P. § 15-207 says: "All information and data obtained in the
discharge of official duty by any probation officer shall be privileged information . . . and
shall not be disclosed directly or indirectly to any other than the judge or to others
entitled under this article to receive reports, unless and until otherwise ordered by a
judge of the court or the director of probation." See also KY. REv. STAT. § 439.210
and 439.220 (1942); MD. LAWS 1931, c. 132, § 1-351F; FED. R. CRIM. P. 32; 18 U.S.C.
3652.
16Which ultimately went into effect on March 21, 1946.
17 Rule 34(c) (2) as recommended in Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Report
of the Advisory Committee 34 (June 1944).
18 As one federal judge said: ". . . the relationship between attorney and client is
and should be one of great intimacy and it would certainly be a novel, and I think
unfortunate, innovation in judicial procedure to sanction judicial disturbance of that
relationship. . . . An attempt by the court to circumscribe the right of counsel to com-
municate with his client by imposing a condition that the contents of the report should
be withheld from the client would tend to undermine the confidence between client
and attorney." FEDERAL PROBATION, October-December 1944, p. 3.
value of the investigation. Those in favor of disclosure were just as
vehement that the defendant should see the information on the simple
constitutional grounds that he was entitled to be confronted with the evi-
dence against him.
Judge Carroll C. Hincks of the United States District Court for the
District of Connecticut, 9 writing in opposition to the proposed rule2"
contended that the requirement that the presentence investigation report
be made available to counsel for the defense "will destroy the confi-
dential status of the presentence report. ,21
Judge Hincks was of the opinion that the proposal for disclosure:
s . . tems not from actual experience which demonstrates that the existing
practice is unsatisfactory or defective, but from a vague, quixotic notion
that "fairness" requires that even after conviction a defendant is entitled
to have access to all the official information on his life and character that
comes to the judge.
22
Judge Hincks thinks that:
• . . the advocates of the rule have unconsciously confused the situations
existing before and after conviction. Before conviction the defendant is
presumed to be innocent. He is entitled to be confronted with the
witnesses against him. He may insist that all hearsay and much opinion
evidence be excluded. Even prior convictions are not admissible on the
issue of his guilt. All those constitutional guarantees terminate with
conviction. That fact, though not disputed, seems forgotten. 23
The Supreme Court of Illinois once declared, in effect, that a dif-
ference does result from conviction.24  The court said this:
• . . any person indicted stands before the bar of Justice clothed with a
presumption of innocence and, as such, is tenderly regarded by the law.
Every safeguard is thrown about him. . . . After a plea of guilty admitted
murderers are in a much different position. As such they are felons.
Instead of being clothed with a presumption of innocence they are naked
criminals, hoping for mercy but entitled only to justice. .... 25
Another writer, however, contended that
.. the argument that a man is entitled to the protection of the Constitution
while it is being determined whether he shall be liable to sanction by the
state, but not in the determination of what that sanction will be, is based on
a distinction of dubious validity. For it would seem that even after con-
viction a man is not shorn of all constitutional protections.2 6
The Supreme Court of the United States decided the matter in the
federal courts by omitting the stipulation which required that presentence
19 Later named to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
20 FED. R. CRIM. P. 34(c) (2). See footnote 17, supra.
21 FEDERAL PROBATION, October-December 1944, p. 3.
22 Id. at 7.
28 Ibid.
24 People v. Riley, 376 I1. 364, 33 N.E. 2d 872 (1941).
25 Id. at 368, 875.
26 Op. cit. supra, note 10, at 568-569.
reports be made available to the interested parties, and the pertinent rule"7
now reads as follows:
The probation service of the court shall make a presentence investigation
and report to the court before the imposition of sentence or the granting of
probation unless the court otherwise directs. The report shall not be sub-
mitted to the court or its contents disclosed to anyone unless the defendant
has pleaded guilty or has been found guilty.
Thus by implication the decision whether to make the presentence
report available to the interested parties after conviction is left to the
discretion of the court.
The Supreme Court of the United States expressed the opinion in
the Williams case2" that there are sound reasons for distinguishing be-
tween trial procedure and sentencing."5 The Court said this:
Highly relevant-if not essential-to his selection of an appropriate
sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning
the defendant's life and characteristics. And modern concepts individualizing
punishment have made it all the more necessary that a sentencing judge
not be denied an opportunity to obtain pertinent information by a require-
ment of rigid adherence to restrictive rules of evidence properly applicable
to the trial.
30
The Court did not consider that imposition of the death penalty
altered the principle. It said:
We cannot say that the due process clause renders a sentence void merely
because a judge gets additional out-of-court information to assist him in
the exercise of this awesome power of imposing the death sentence. 1
In discussing due process of law as it relates to probation, Sol Rubin
pointed out in a recent article in which he referred to the Williams case:
• . . It was inevitable that the U. S. Supreme Court would uphold a statute
which provided for a presentence report to the court based on information
given by persons outside the courtroom not confronted by the defendant
or subjected to cross-examination by him. The court said, "Most of the
information now relied on by judges to guide them in the intelligent
imposition of sentences would be unavailable if information were re-
stricted to that given in open court by witnesses subject to cross-examination.
• . . Such a procedure could endlessly delay criminal administration in a
retrial of collateral issues."
8 2
Rubin admits that termination of the trial ends the defendant's
protection by the rules of evidence. He finds it interesting, however, that
. . the Supreme Court relied on common law sentencing practice rather
than on the probation statute, despite its tribute to the modernity of
probation laws. In its opinion the court said-and it appears the precedent
27 FED. R. CluM. P. 32(c) (1), 18 U.S.C. 3652.
28 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
29 See further, Henry P. Chandler, "Latter-Day Procedures in the Sentencing and
Treatment of Offenders in the Federal Courts," 37 VA. L. REV. 831-835 (1951).
80337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949).
31 Id. at 252.
32 Rubin, Sol, "Probation and Due Process of Law," Focus, March 1952, p. 40.
cited is sufficient to justify the holding-"Before and since the American
colonies became a nation, courts in this country and in England practiced
a policy under which a sentencing judge could exercise a wide discretion
in the sources and types of evidence used to assist him in determining
the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by
law. Out-of-court affidavits have been used frequently and of course in
the smaller communities sentencing judges naturally have in mind their
knowledge of the personalities and backgrounds of convicted offenders."
The decision, like most due process decisions, is a negative one, ruling that
a particular practice, restrictive of the defendant's rights, does not violate
constitutional and statutory due process requirements 33
Judges who follow the practice of treating presentence reports as
confidential and use their discretion in imparting information to others
find their philosophy well stated, according to Henry P. Chandler," in
these words of Mr. Justice Black in the Williams case:
The due process clause should not be treated as a device for freezing the
evidential procedure of sentencing in the mold of trial procedure. So to
treat the due process clause would hinder if not preclude all courts-state
and federal-from making progressive efforts to improve the administration
of criminal justice.3 5
Disclosure Results in Sentencing Delays
Delay in sentencing has been proposed as another major argument
against disclosure.
Traditionally, a defendant in a criminal proceeding is entitled to a
trial without delay. The Constitution of the United States provides for
this."6 The stipulation for sentence without undue delay is added to the
probation acts of many states, if not explicitly, at least by implication.
To speed up the sentencing process, it is generally emphasized that the
probation officer shall make the necessary presentence investigation
"promptly,"" or "without unreasonable delay."3
The objective of speed is salutary. For sentence to be long delayed
while the offender is on bond is to breed disrespect for the law." For it
to be delayed while the defendant is in custody is to provide incarceration
without purpose. Some delay in sentence for the purpose of providing
sufficient time for the preparation of a presentence investigation report,
although laudable, has been troublesome to courts and probation officers
alike. And as Judge Hincks said:
If the rule requiring a disclosure of the report be adopted, defense counsel
can properly urge that the only reason for the rule was to afford opportunity
33 Ibid.
84 Op. cit. supra note 29, at 834.
35337 U.S. 241, 251 (1949).
86 U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI.3 7 E.g. N.Y. CODE CRiM. P. § 931; ILL. ANN. STAT. § 37.773.
38FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a) and (c).
39 Hincks, op. cir. supra note 21, at 7.
for an independent investigation of material therein and can then protest
in all sincerity that their pressing trial engagements elsewhere will prevent
them from promptly undertaking their investigation of the subject matter.
Such tactics might easily result in delays of several weeks.
40
Judge Hincks goes on to add that the trial judge will face an added
dilemma:
He will be accused of frustrating the rule unless he affords defense counsel
reasonable opportunity to verify the report in the field without interference
with his court assignments elsewhere, and yet he must so contrive that
sentence shall not be unduly delayed. The practical result will be that the
offender whose lawyer is most in demand for trial work will have the most
success in stalling off the dreaded day of sentence. And it is common
knowledge that the most notorious offenders often are served by the busiest
lawyers.
4 1
On the other hand, it may be said that the argument of delay is not
a strong one. One of the weaknesses in many jurisdictions is hasty and
offhand sentencing. A delay may have value if due to the preparation of
a presentence investigation report. Thus a contribution to a sounder
sentencing policy is made. As Rubin says, "If still further delay is
introduced by the defendant in controverting material in a presentence
report, it is a privilege for which he, not the court, pays in time."'"
It may even be said that argument about statements in the presen-
tence report would not often be time-consuming. Large portions of a
report would likely not be challenged. Other points under challenge
could be proved or disproved quickly. One writer mentions a time-saving
compromise:
If any statement denied is difficult to prove, and the sentencing court does
not consider the issue sufficiently important to warrant the trouble of
having evidence produced, the court may simply disregard the statement.
It is only where the truth or falsity . ..will be highly determinative .. .
that . . . proof will become necessary.4
3
It has been pointed out too that if a hearing controverting material
in the report is permitted, the manner of conducting it is at the discretion
of the judge. No formal evidentiary rules are required, unless the judge
desires them.
Disclosure Assures Impartiality of Report
Another question raised is that since appellate courts may have access
to presentence reports, it follows that the defendant needs to have access
to the report if he is to make a sensible decision whether to appeal on
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Op. cit. supra note 32, at 44.
48 Op. cit. supra note 10 at 572.
44E.g. N.Y. CODE CRIM. P. § 931.
the basis of material in the report. In effect, giving the defendant access
to the report may promote the requirement in many laws that the report
be "accurate" and "full."44  Under such a statute, it would follow that
due process requires an accurate report. And if this is so, must not some
authority outside the trial judge for whom the report is made have an
opportunity to scrutinize the report and judge its accuracy and com-
pleteness.
In Illinois, it has been held that such scrutiny may be made by a
court higher than the sentencing court. In People v. Adams,45 affidavits
in contradiction of the presentence report had been presented to the trial
court and weighed against the probation officer's report. Both statements
were considered by the Supreme Court of Illinois which said that the
presentence report is not a document inviolate in the bosom of the court,
but is also subject to review by an appellate court. If the report is found
not to be complete, the defendant's rights are held to have been infringed;
that due process demands a proper probation report. In reversing the
lower court and ordering a new trial in the Adams case, the court said,
46
"It cannot be said in this condition of the record that the report of the




But would disclosure of the presentence report to defendant and
his counsel assure its accuracy? Judge Hincks thinks it would take a
great deal more than that. He believes this may be the result of a dispute
on accuracy:
Normally counsel will ask his client whether the detail of the report is
true, but all familiar with the task know how commonly a convicted
defendant will deny every unfavorable feature of such a report. Obviously
such a denial is of far from conclusive effect. Defense counsel will then
feel obligated to make an extended verification in the field. If this is
conscientiously done, every essential element of the report, at least in the
vast majority of cases, will be confirmed and all the additional labor on the
part of counsel and possibly a substantial addition to his fee will have been
for naught.48
What if, even then, the presentence report is still impugned? What
can be done? Judge Hincks believes that safeguards of fallibility can be
developed in another way. In a workmanlike report ". . . the probation
officer will check with the defendant much of the factual data which he
has obtained from other sources.""' If conflicts still remain, the officer
will be on notice that his report is being challenged and "... may be
45 379 ILL. 323, 40 N.E. 2d 730 (1942).
46 Id. at 3.
47 The statute referred to says: "Before granting any request for admission to proba-
tion, the court shall require the probation officer to investigate accurately and promptly
the case of the defendant making such request .. " ILL. ANN. STAT. § 37.773.
48 FEDERAL PROBATION, October-December 1944, p. 4.
491d. at 5.
trusted . . . just as much as the defendant's lawyer, to undertake any
further investigation that seems desirable." In this way, an unresolved
conflict ". . . can be as well brought to the attention of a judge in the
report itself as by counsel in open court."5 The judge can then either
disregard the item in dispute or, if it is of controlling interest, call for
more information or evidence. Judge Hincks concludes:
Thus in the great mass of cases a cautious judge, without disclosing the
contents of the report and in practical effect inviting an attack on its
accuracy, can in a few minutes prior to the imposition of sentence ac-
complish all the verification that can possibly be useful. Thus viewed,
the disclosure of the report for verification by partisan counsel seems
wholly unnecessary as a safeguard of accuracy. 51
Effects on the Correctional Process
What is the effect of disclosure or nonaccess of the presentence
report to defendant and his counsel, considering the matter as part of the
correctional process for offenders? There are really two problems in-
volved here.
The first is that disclosure of the report to defense counsel may
destroy the confidential nature of the investigation and make it difficult,
if not impossible, for probation departments to compile meaningful and
searching reports. Secondly, disclosure may affect the attitude of the
offender and his relationship with the court, the probation officer, and
correctional authorities in general.
Destruction of the confidential nature of the report.-What of the
destruction of the confidential nature of the report and consequent drying
up of sources of information? This is the argument often used by the
opponents of disclosure. Rubin feels that "Probably there would be no
opposition to giving the defendant ... access to the report if it were felt
• . . (this) . . . would not damage the presentence investigation."52
Furthermore, he believes that the "usual report" could be shown quite
safely to the defendant; that since a great deal of the information comes
from public records and from sources indifferent to the defendant, dis-
closure does no harm. Even then, in his judgment, there would be ade-
quate means of safeguarding the identity of confidential informants."
He supports this position further by referring to some professionals in
the social work field who within recent years have come to believe that a
sharing of so-called confidential information with the person being helped
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Op. cit. supra note 32, at 9.
53Id. at 10.
"will insure maximum value in the use of collateral information."54
At least one supporter of disclosure admits the possibility of a partial
drying up of sources of information. But this, he contends:
. . . is an unavoidable consequence of any system of criminal administration
which requires that the defendant be informed of the evidence against him,
and would seem to be no more than one of the many burdens imposed
on the state in any such system because of the overriding importance of
avoiding falsity and oppression of the individual."5
These are not compelling arguments to opponents of disclosure,
particularly to probation officers who are responsible for the investiga-
tions. In their judgment, disclosure would dry up sources of information
and make it difficult, if not impossible, to amass meaningful data. Judge
Hincks thinks as much. "
It is not necessary here to spell out the obvious handicaps probation
officers would encounter in dealing with the medical profession (particu-
larly psychiatrists), government agencies (such as the military services,
Veterans Administration), social agencies, families, employers, and neigh-
bors if, under a system of disclosure, these sources were told that any
information they would give would be disclosed to the defendant and that
the chances were good they would become involved in time-consuming
and unpleasant controversies in open court. The rules of many such
agencies state that the information in their files is confidential and is to be
divulged only to official persons and agencies, and then only under rigid
requirements covering use of the information. Even individuals without
limitation on disclosure would prefer not to give information under any
arrangement for unlimited disclosure.
The probation officer would thus be reduced to including in the
report only the most elementary factual information from public records
and statements about the defendant which either were inconsequential
or were in the defendant's favor. The result would be a weak, ineffective
report with little or none of the more meaningful data on attitudes,
feelings, and personal standards and relationships so essential to adequate
presentence investigation reports and probation supervision.
Effect on the attitude of the defendant.-What is the effect of non-
disclosure on the defendant himself? To turn again to Rubin. If the
report is not shown to the defendant,
. . . what is the effect on his attitude of the realization that he was not
trusted, that an account and evaluation of his own history was concealed
from him? What of his feeling of unfairness that the crucial matter of
541bid. Quoted by Rubin from Helen H. Perlman, 'The Case Worker's Use of
Collateral Information," SOCIAL CASEWORK, October 1951.
55 Op. cit. supra note 10, at 571.
56 Op. cit. supra note 21, at 3.
sentence has been done without his knowing the basis for it, without an
opportunity to contribute to it with knowledge of what it contains?
57
The defendant speculates on what is known and reported. Later, on
probation, "he may be on guard because the court and probation officer
have not trusted him with information he feels should be his."
58
Practically, this is not the way it works out. Probation treatment
(and treatment begins with the initial presentence contact! ) is based on
close person-to-person relationship between officer and probationer. Mu-
tual understanding, confidence, and a sense of fair play and justice
characterize the effective handling of probationers. " This interplay of
confidence anticipates a mutual sharing of knowledge throughout. In
this way, the probationer comes to learn of derogatory information against
him; but from the probation officer, not from a presentence report! Such
mutual confidence comes through the personal relationship of officer and
client. Reading a presentence report will not do it; more likely it will
destroy any possibility of later understanding.
Conclusion
The two factors of greatest importance in a discussion of the confi-
dential nature of presentence investigation reports are these:
1. Whether denial of the presentence reports to counsel for the
defendants violates or does not violate rights of defendants required
by due process of law; and
2. Whether disclosure of the report to counsel for the defense de-
stroys or does not destroy the value of the presentence investigation.
Perhaps the clearest answer to both these points of debate has come
from the Supreme Court in the Williams case, described earlier.
On due process, the Court said that there are sound reasons for
distinguishing between trial procedure and sentencing procedure, and
that a sentencing judge should not be denied pertinent information by a
requirement "of rigid adherence to restrictive rules of evidence properly
applicable to the trial.""0
On the possibility of destruction of the value of the presentence
investigation, the Court had this to say:
Under the practice of individualizing punishments, investigational techniques
have been given an important role. Probation workers making reports of
their investigations have not been trained to prosecute but to aid offenders.
5T Op. cit. supra note 32, at 9.
58 Ibid.
59See e.g. Probation and Related Measures, UNITED NATIONS, p. 247 (1951)
passim; THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES, Vol. II, Proba-
tion, Chapt. VIII.
(0337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949).
Their reports have been given a high value by conscientious judges who
want to sentence persons on the best available information rather than on
guesswork and inadequate information. To deprive sentencing judges of
this kind of information would undermine penological procedural policies
that have been cautiously adopted throughout the nation after careful con-
sideration and experimentation. We must recognize that most of the infor-
mation now relied upon by judges to guide them in the intelligent imposi-
tion of sentences would be unavailable if information were restricted to
that given in open court by witnesses subject to cross-examination .... 61
These are compelling words.
61 Id. at 249.
